Wildlife Tour

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Home > Field Trips > Wildlife Tour > Property Rights

Theories

Establishing Property Rights: The ADMADE Programme

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The production and consumption of elephant ivory, rhino horn, skins and game meat have considerable negative externalities such as the loss of animal species. Poaching and hunting of endangered species continues as the land on which the wildlife lives is not owned and hence the wildlife is not owned. The poachers, often members of local village communities or in collaboration with those communities, do not pay any money for the animals they hunt. As a consequence of being able to hunt animals without paying for them the tendency is simply to over hunt leading to near extinction is some species. Where the land and the animals are not owned no one has the incentive to managed them in a sustainable way.

One solution to this example of market failure is to establish property rights. This means that individual people or communities of people are allocated land so they take on the responsibility for stewardship of the land. They have an incentive to use the land so that it yields a financial return in the present and the future.

In Zambia the protection measures introduced to try to protect the wildlife from poaching in the 1970s and 1980s failed to prevent the large-scale slaughter of Zambia's elephant and rhino population. Research showed that one major factor causing increased poaching related to the transfer of ownership, during colonial rule, away from local communities to the state. Communities no longer had any stake in conserving the wildlife and as a consequence poaching expanded. National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) attempted to deal with the increasing poaching by introducing the ADMADE programme. ADMADE stands for Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas. This scheme attempted to encourage communities to take on the responsibility of managing wildlife in the area. To do this local communities had to be empowered and involved in the decision relating to wildlife management.

  • Local committees were formed to increase community involvement in wildlife management. The included offering employment opportunities in wildlife conservation through creating village scouts.
  • A share of hunting revenues was passed through the local committees to communities, in order to establish a direct financial benefit from the wildlife in the are of their community. Previously, these revenues had been completely retained by government.

The government recognised that resources needed to be put into poverty reduction and development programmes at the community level. As communities engaged in poaching or collaborated with poachers in response to economic necessity then strategies to improve incomes and the life chances of people in the villages. Thus schools, primary health clinics and housing were provided.

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Related Glossary Items:
Property Rights

Related Issues:
The Vicious Cycle of Poverty

Related Theories:
The Theory of Externalities
Malthus and the Law of Diminishing Returns
Measuring Poverty
Poverty and the Cycles of Poverty
Market Failure
Sustainability



 
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